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ABSTRACT
Signiicant work has been presented over the last decade looking at
the application of ℧ixed Criticality Scheduling. The premise being
that if a failure occurs the scheduler performs a mode change from
normal mode to high-criticality mode. In high-criticality mode,
some low criticality tasks are given a reduced service (e.g. not
executed or executed at a diferent period). Recently work has
been performed to bound the number of low criticality jobs that
might be skipped while the scheduler operates in high-criticality
mode. However a signiicant gap in the analysis is to understand
for how long the service to low criticality tasks may be reduced, i.e.
how often the system switches to a high-criticality mode and how
long the high-criticality mode is sustained. This is essential as part
of supporting software certiication. In this paper we consider a
process, agnostic to the underlying scheduling strategy, designed to
allow a system integrator to address this gap by assessing the level
of service provided to low criticality tasks. The result is a safety
argument with supporting evidence based on a real life case study,
taken from a DAL-A certiied aircraft engine control system.1
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·Computer systems organization→Real-time systemarchi-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Real time embedded software tasks developed for safety critical
systems, such as civil avionics engine control systems, are typically
developed according to a speciic Development Assurance Level
(DAL) [21]. The DAL indicates a criticality level for a component
and is assigned based on the consequence to the system's safety
that a failure of this component could cause. This paper considers
the model presented in DO-178C [20], that deines DAL-A as the
highest criticality level and DAL-E the lowest.
It is typically assumed that the amount of efort assigned to
producing enough evidence to prove the correct operation of a
software component is directly proportional to its DAL [22]. In
practice though, it is still desirable that low DAL software operates
as expected; a low DAL component may also be essential to achieve
the desired customer capability. Put simply a task's criticality is
not necessarily related to its ‘importance'. Furthermore, a low DAL
task may still be bound by strict temporal requirements; a task's
criticality is independent from its temporal properties.
In the literature a ℧ixed Criticality System (℧CS) is a system
which combines software of multiple DALs on the same processor.
The dominating model that has emerged in the ield of ℧ixed Crit-
icality Scheduling is that of the double computation time model
irst introduced by Vestal [22]. The model uses two measures of
Ωorst Case Execution Time (ΩCET) for each task: one measure
for the low DAL mode (CLO ), and a higher igure for the high criti-
cality mode (CHI ). In practise CHI may be derived from a sound
ΩCET analysis whereas CLO could be derived from a best efort
approach. This model essentially allows a system integrator to cap-
italise on the (strong) assumption that a high criticality task's CHI
is pessimistic, while its CLO may be reliable, but optimistic. This
is facilitated by allowing low DAL tasks to execute as long as all
tasks within the system execute within their CLO bounds. If any
tasks execute beyond these bounds, service to low DAL tasks may
be reduced or stopped.
Regardless of the scheduling methodology employed, the general
assumption in the literature is that low DAL components can be
denied service at times of heightened system utilisation. In practise,
in a well-designed system this should only occur in extreme cases,
if ever. Unfortunately, this potential denial of service cannot be
quantiied through the schedulability analysis and the performance
of the integrated system in operation needs to be considered to
understand how long and how often loss of services may occur.
This is because it is not known howmany tasks, if any, may execute
beyond their timing bound within a certain time window without
executing the system in a representative environment. This means
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it is di cult to obtain concrete proof that a low DAL component
will receive a good enough level of service to fulil its mission
requirements.
One strategy to combat this in a ℧CS may be to increase CLO
timing budgets across the system in order to ensure that low DAL
components are ‘never' denied service. However, the more a task's
CLO increases towards itsCHI ; the less the system is able to beneit
from utilising the CHI pessimism. Furthermore, (unless CLO ==
CHI ) then even this approach cannot be guaranteed to provide the
necessary service in all cases. In essence, it is di cult to understand
the performance aforded to low DAL tasks in a ℧CS without
performing a dynamic assessment in a representative environment.
This paper considers how a system integrator may develop a low
DAL task and express its requirements, with a use case taken from a
real aircraft engine control system. The aim is to describe a process
that could be employed to assess the online level of service given
to a low DAL component in order to allow an informed decision
on system performance to be made, and by providing evidence
supporting timing requirements with a suicient conidence level
to support certiication arguments.
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• To provide a process for assessing the service aforded to a
low DAL task, agnostic of scheduling methodology.
• To assess how realistic claims can be expressed as part of a
certiication case or argument
• To demonstrate the proposed process in the context of a real
aircraft engine control system application
1.1 Related Work
Vestal [22] was one of the irst publications to consider the schedula-
bility of a ℧CS. The work draws the comparison that the reliability
of the ΩCET igure used for each task is proportional to its criti-
cality. This is based on the observation that low DAL tasks are not
developed, or veriied, to the same extent that high DAL tasks are,
and therefore the output ΩCET igures cannot be expected to be
as reliable.
Building of Vestal's work, Baruah et al. [2] introduced Adaptive
℧ixed Criticality (A℧C). The A℧C protocol de-schedules all low
DAL tasks if any high DAL task executes for longer than its CLO .
The original A℧C algorithm was extended to delay the system's
switch to the high criticality mode. The bailout protocol uses a
‘Bailout Fund'; a measure of how much slack time is currently
in the system [3]. Should the Bailout Fund fall below zero, then
the system reverts to a high DAL only mode until such time as
the system reaches idle, or the Bailout Fund increases above zero.
This protocol essentially delays, potentially suspending completely,
entry into the high criticality mode using the assumption that it is
unlikely that several tasks will overrun their CLO at the same time.
Ωhile low DAL tasks may have less stringent timing or veriica-
tion requirements, they are still important for the correct operation
of the system. Several papers have thus explored approaches to im-
prove load DAL task support and ofer more realistic models where
low DAL tasks are not abandoned [6]. In particular, the temporal
properties of a low DAL tasks can be altered, reducing its service, or
execution time, without afecting its overall requirements. Jan et al.
[13] looked at applying the elastic task model, originally proposed
by Buttazzo et al. [8], to a ℧CS. Rather than de-scheduling all tasks,
this model instead extends the period of low DAL tasks to reduce
the utilisation on the system. In contrast, the so-called imprecise
mixed criticality model [18] reduces low DAL execution budgets in
order to improve wider system performance. Finally, another ap-
proach reduces the priority of low DAL tasks as required, efectively
executing low DAL tasks during periods of high system utilisation
in system slack time only [5]. However, this is wholly dependent
on the expressed requirements of the low DAL task being lexible
enough the support the proposed models.
Less stringent requirements were introduced to allow for a dei-
nition of the Quality of Service (QoS) ofered to a task in the form
of (m −k)-irm deadlines [11], where a dynamic failure occurs only
if fewer thanm out of k consecutive jobs of a task fail to meet their
deadlines. The weakly hard real-time system model proposed by
Bernat et al. [4] generalises this model by allowing non-consecutive
deadline misses over a k jobs window. Typical Ωorst-Case Analy-
sis [12] provides for an evaluation of the QoS ofered to a task by
bounding the number of deadline misses it can sufer in a weakly
hard real-time system.
The A℧C analysis was extended in [9] to support weakly hard
real-time systems such that service is provided to low DAL tasks in
high criticality mode by allowing them to run a reduced number of
jobs in a given cycle. The analysis efectively determines whether
or not all low DAL tasks will at least meet a (m − k)-irm deadline
requirements. ℧edina et al [19] also considered a (m − k)-irm
model but to delay the need to switch to a high criticality mode.
No service is provided to low DAL tasks once the switch occurs,
and tasks may be skipped if their predecessor exceeds its budget.
They rely on a probabilistic process for assessing the availability of
low criticality tasks, assuming timing error rates are known. Ωhile
these approaches can provide some guarantee on the minimum
service ofered to a task, neither can provide for an evaluation of
how often, and how long the system sustains a high criticality mode
under diferent strategies.
The resilient model [7] utilises graceful degradation to improve
low DAL task performance, by delaying the switch to the high crit-
icality mode and the loss of service. Similarly to the weakly hard
systems, robustness is supported at the task level where certain ‘ro-
bust' tasks2 are capable of skipping individual jobs when requested.
In addition, the approach employs resilience at the system towards
supporting a certain number of timing failures. Service guarantees
are provided under each scheduler mode, based on the number of
supported timing failures, up to the point where low DAL tasks
have to be dropped.
In summary, ℧CS previous research has focused irst on high
DAL task requirements, with the static analysis showing that in
the worst case low DAL tasks will receive no service. ℧ethods
such as elastic scheduling or weak hard real-time aimed to improve
low DAL tasks overall service, with graceful degradation aimed
to provide some control on the occurrence of service loss for low
DAL tasks, or the reduction in service. Even though the move to
the high criticality mode may be delayed, it still may occur at some
point resulting in no or degraded service for all low DAL tasks
in the system. The methods ofer many ways to help improve or
2A task's robustness is independent from its criticality
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guarantee low DAL task performance under adverse circumstances,
but have not addressed how to assess this performance and service
in a meaningful way especially to support certiication, i.e. when a
mode change may occur, or what impact (by way of duration and
frequency of loss of service) this may have on the low DAL, and⁄or
robust, tasks, when all tasks are not continuously assumed to be
running to their allocated budgets.
The low DAL task service assessment conducted in this paper is
designed to be agnostic to the underlying scheduler methodology.
Ωithout loss of generality, this paper focuses on the Robust ℧ixed
Criticality ℧odel3. The reason for focusing on this model is that the
concept of being able to carefully manage a graceful degradation to
the system, including the introduction of tasks that can be disabled
for speciic periods of time (encompassing the weakly-hard model),
is well suited to the case study investigated here.Ωhereas the classic
℧CS models, such as the A℧C, ofer no graceful degradation and
instead subject low DAL tasks to an immediate drop in service, if
required.
1.2 Robust Mixed Criticality Systems
The Robust ℧ixed Criticality ℧odel as presented by Burns et al. [7]
introduced the following deinitions for a robust mixed criticality
system:
Deinition 1. A robust task is one that can safely drop one non-
started job in any extended time interval.
Deinition 2. The robustness of a complete system is measured
by its F count (how many job overruns can it tolerate without jobs
being dropped or deadlines missed) and its ℧ count (the number
of job overruns the system can tolerate once each robust task has
dropped one job).
Deinition 3. A resilient system is one that employs forms of
graceful degradation that adequately cope with more than ℧ over-
runs.
A fault is measured when one task overruns its CLO , where as
an error is the manifestation of a one or many faults and represents
the point where a task fails to adhere to its timing requirements. A
resilient system is designed to cope with one or many faults, while
avoiding errors.
The resilient system model introduced in [7] is capable of coping
with F faults (F -mode or fail robust), before reverting to a mode
where robust tasks skip their jobs (M-mode or fail resilient). At
this point the system is capable of coping with further faults up
to a total ofM faults, where F < M . This provides a set bound on
the size of a robust task skip burst. Once the fault count increases
aboveM , the system reverts to the high criticality mode where no
service is provided to low criticality tasks. Once the system reaches
the idle state, the failure count is reset and, if required, the system
reverts to the normal mode.
The schedulability analysis presented in [7] provides a proof that
high criticality, robust tasks, meet their schedulability requirements.
The analysis also provides a bound on the number of jobs a robust
task may skip between idle points. However, the analysis provides
no guarantees on the service given to low criticality tasks, or indeed
the time between individual robust task skip bursts.
3Additional results on the application of the service assessment method on the Robust
and A℧C+ ℧CS models are available in [15].
The aim of the process presented in the remainder of this paper
is to assess the performance, and critically, the failure rate aforded
to a robust or low DAL task in a representative system. As no
service is provided to low DAL tasks in the high criticality mode, it
is important to understand how often and for how long the system
may sustain the high criticality mode. The statistical analysis is
designed to then provide a system integrator with the information,
and conidence, required to make an informed decision on whether
a robust or low DAL task will meet its temporal requirements.
2 CASE STUDY
The case study investigated as part of this paper is taken directly
from a Rolls-Royce Aircraft Engine Control System. In order to
provide a secure record of engine performance, the control system
regularly writes system parameters to lash memory. Ωhile non-
volatile and secure, the time taken to write to this lash memory is
considerable, with the task's execution time being directly propor-
tional to the amount of data being written. Therefore, the amount
of data written to the data store is minimised as far as possible. In
order to support future design and maintenance goals, it is desirable
to reduce this limitation.
The control system contains a periodic task responsible for writ-
ing data to lash memory. This task reads from a memory bufer,
written to by other tasks, before copying the bufer to lash. At
present the task is certiied as a high DAL component and treated
as a hard real time task, however the task could more easily be
designed to execute for longer, with an assumption that it may
periodically drop jobs. This assumes necessary protections are put
in place to protect the wider system.
The existing system consists of a set of several hundred tasks in
the order of tens of thousand lines of code. All tasks in the system
are high criticality. In order to support this study the code base
has been ported to a scheduler designed to implement a robust
system [7], with the lash memory task being treated as a robust
low DAL task. The ported system consists of 17 tasks with support
mechanisms provided by a commercial-of-the-shelf RTOS.
The newly conigured robust low DAL lash memory task was
integrated into the schedulability analysis of the control system, at
the same time the execution time budget of the task was increased,
while the period was decreased. Overall this increased the permis-
sible utilisation of the task by a factor of 60. The system was shown
to be schedulable in the low DAL, fail robust (F-mode), fail resilient
(℧-mode) and high DAL modes as deined by the robust model [7].
This increase in utilisation was only permitted thanks to the use
of a mixed-criticality system exploiting the diference between the
analysed (sound, safe and pessimistic) ΩCET used for the CHI and
the (test measured, robust but potentially optimistic) system high
water mark time used for each task's CLO .
The newly conigured lash memory task is designed to con-
tinuously write data when called to do so. If a job of the task is
skipped, then it will simply resume writing to memory from the
next entry in the memory bufer. The principal requirement is that
the memory bufer does not overlow, and so the task is designed
to write more data than necessary on each invocation. So following
a period of reduced service the task is able to recover and return to
normal operation provided it has suicient time.
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For this analysis, the following assumptions surrounding the
robust task have been deined:
• Due to the task's increased execution budget, if given full
service the task is capable of writing data to lash memory
at a faster rate than the reporting tasks can write data to the
shared memory bufer
• The shared memory bufer is suiciently large to allow the
lash memory task to skip up to four jobs
• Once the lash memory task skips a burst of up to four jobs,
the task must execute the following four jobs in order to
allow the task to avoid data loss.
Therefore the overriding requirement for analysis is that each
time the robust lash memory task sufers a job skip burst, it should
have a clear period of at least four successful executions before it
can skip a job again. If the task skips a job in less time, the task is said
to have sufered an error. The task period itself is 12.5ms, therefore
the basic requirement for the task can be deined as follows:
Deinition 4. A lash memory task error is recorded when a job
skip bursts lasts more than 50ms or two separate job skip bursts
occur with a less than 50ms interval.
The following assumptions have been made about the wider
system:
• The occurrence of an individual task overrun is very rare.
Rationale: The deined CLO for each task, representing the
computation time beyond which a task would register a failure,
has been generated from an extensive testing regime and car-
ries with it a high level of conidence. However, being derived
from a simple measurement technique it is still assumed to be
optimistic.
• Individual task overruns are independent and are not reliant
on the current operation of the control system. Rationale: an
overrun is an event unique to each task, and not a systematic
event caused by an error or operation at the system level.
• Task overruns can be assumed to be independent of hardware
operation. Rationale: The system is designed to be resilient to
external hardware failures, secondly the target processor design
is compliant with DO-254 as a high criticality device.
The requirements on the robust task can be expressed as a (4−8)-
irm deadline [9]. By scheduling the robust task in the high critical-
ity mode at a reduced rate, the schedulability analysis would then
verify it is allocated suicient service. However the contribution
of the robust task to the utilisation of the high criticality mode
renders the system unschedulable. Instead, we propose a process
to assess the service received by the robust task and validate its
requirements, by considering how often the system switches to
high-criticality mode and how long the high-criticality mode is
sustained.
3 CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
This paper focuses on an aerospace application, and so the guidance
provided byDO-178C [20] is used as the focus of this work. However
the guidelines are considered similar to those detailed in other
software domains such as ISO26262 and IEC61508 [10]. The focus
of this work is predominately on understanding the performance of
a robust and⁄or low DAL component, the certiication requirements
surrounding software partitioning and mixed criticality have been
assessed in a parallel work and are not discussed further in this
paper. There this paper will only consider temporal performance.
DO-178C requires that the certiication documentation is able
to justify the accuracy, correctness and robustness of the system.
This requires an understanding of the temporal performance of the
system (with respect to task ΩCETs and system schedulability),
and conirmation that the system's temporal requirements have
been met.
Ωhen reviewing low DAL and⁄or robust tasks, this requires the
system integrator understand the potential error rate of each task's
temporal requirements, and furthermore show that this rate is
acceptable given the system wide efect of a temporal requirement
error.
The prior work in the ield of ℧CS has presented static analysis
models for proving the service aforded to high criticality tasks.
However the previous work has not yet ofered solutions for system
integrators to generate the evidence required to meet the low DAL
task certiication requirements discussed in this section.
4 ANALYSIS OF ROBUST TASK
PERFORMANCE
Regardless of the method chosen to control low DAL or robust
tasks, the performance of said tasks is wholly dependant on the
actual performance of the system. Therefore the process conducted
here is based on a statistical assessment of a set of execution results
extracted from either a test rig execution during a system-level
test campaign, or from a scheduler simulation of the system in
question. This paper predominately follows the results obtained
from simulation. The use of which allows a signiicantly larger data
set to be compiled, de-risking the system design early in its life
cycle. Ultimately these results are supplemented and improved as
testing of the system progresses by test data obtained from a full
end to end test campaign.
The simulator is initialised using execution proiles extracted
from the system during task-level testing designed to mimic system
behaviour while in operation [16]. This ensures that the execution
proiles provide a realistic representation of the task's actual per-
formance when in operation. These execution proiles, including
RTOS overhead measurements, are input into a bespoke scheduler
simulator which is executed on a high performance server over a
thousand times in order to build up a comprehensive set of results.
The simulator has been validated against the real system, and is
designed to be reviewed and improved as additional real system
performance data is generated.
The execution time of each task is output by the scheduler, as
is information on whether a task executes, or is blocked. The data
output by the simulator is analysed to measure the time between
each data-set skip. A single execution simulates thirty minutes of
scheduler time.
The results are then input into the statistical assessment intro-
duced in this section, that aims to provide a conidence in adherence
to the low DAL component requirements, as well as providing an
understanding of the probability of the component's requirement
being broken. Together these results should allow a system integra-
tor to make a guided decision on whether the lowDAL component's
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Figure 1: Goal Structured Notation Argument for the Overall low DAL Requirement
performance is acceptable or not. This forms the principal contri-
bution presented in this paper.
The following sections introduce a Goal Structured Notation
(GSN) argument for the approach, as well as providing results from
applying the analysis to the Rolls-Royce case study introduced in
Section 2.
4.1 Goal Structured Notation
Ωithin this and the following sections, we use the Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [14]. GSN is a widely used approach within the
industry [1]. The principal purpose of a goal structure is to show
how goals (claims about the system) are successively broken down
into sub-goals until a point is reached where claims can be sup-
ported by direct reference to available evidence (solutions). As part
of this decomposition, using the GSN it is also possible to make
clear the argument strategies adopted (e.g. adopting a quantitative
or qualitative approach), the rationale for the approach (assump-
tions, justiications) and the context in which goals are stated (e.g.
the system scope or the assumed operational role). The GSN argu-
ments in paper use Goals (G), Assumptions (A), Statements (St) and
Solutions (S). For further details on GSN see [14].
Figure 1 shows a GSN argument that expands how Deinition 4
is assessed. The principal claim (G0) that two job skip bursts will
not occur within 50ms, is analysed using a statistical analysis of
results obtained by a simulation of the system.
This is in the context that the simulation is a representative
example of the real system, and that the overall estimated error
rate is acceptable. This error rate can then be taken forward and
included as part of a system wide certiication case for the low DAL
or robust software.
The strategy for the analysis is broken down into four key sub
claims, as follows:
• G1 - Conidence - The simulation achieves appropriate cov-
erage
• G2 - Likelihood - The simulation output provides an under-
standing of the likelihood of an error
• G3 - Correctness - The simulation is a valid representation
of a real system
• G4 - Acceptability - The minimum time between data-set
skips is acceptable.
The following sections describe each of these goals in more
detail.
4.2 G1 - Conidence
In order to properly understand the performance of the system it is
vital that the statistical analysis is performed across a signiicantly
large sample that represents the real performance of the system.
Claim G1 aims to conirm this is the case and aims to understand
whether enough testing has taken place.
Figure 2 shows the extension to claim G1. This claim is fulilled
by ensuring the simulation executes for long enough to indicate
that most execution time variations have been observed (G5) and
that further exploration of the search space does not reveal new
results (G6).
4.2.1 G5. Claim G5 is concerned with understanding whether a
single simulation executes for long enough, and is supported by an
assessment that reviews whether continued simulation reveals any
additional diferences or signiicant diferences in the distribution
(S10). This is important to understand as it helps build the argument
that the statistical analysis is performed across a fully representative
set of execution proiles. This is tested by reviewing the minimum
time between job skips, as well as the conidence interval and the
mean. In all cases the aim of the assessment is to review whether,
as the simulation continues, the results have converged.
Figure 3 shows the results from one execution of the simulator
and illustrates the variation in the conidence interval, mean and
minimum as the simulation progresses. The results show that de-
spite a signiicant amount of variability initially, the conidence
interval (the range within which there is 95% conidence that the
mean resides within) converges around approximately 10ms, and
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Figure 2: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Conidence of the Analysis
Figure 3: Changes in Conidence Interval (left), Mean (right top) and Minimum (right bottom) of the Time Between Job Skips
Over Simulation Time
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the mean and minimum converge around 350ms and 60ms respec-
tively. The key to analysing these plots is to identify whether the
simulation results are changing as the simulation continues, or in
essence do the results indicate that further exploration does not
reveal any new or diferent results.
4.2.2 G6. Claim G6 is concerned with understanding whether a
large scale evaluation over a large number of simulations produces
a similar result to that of a single simulation, this aims to provide
further conidence that the search space has been explored sui-
ciently. The claim conirms irstly whether the analysis is repeatable
when a large scale simulation is performed, and the results from
multiple short simulations create a combined result equivalent to
one long simulation.
Claim G6 is supported by an assessment of the job skip dis-
tributions over 1000 iterations of the simulator using both a χ2
distribution equivalence test (G8) and an Earth ℧overs Distribution
(E℧D) (G9). In both cases the simulation from the irst test is used
for comparison against the other 999. Secondly G10 claims that
when two short simulations are appended together they provide
equivalent results to one long simulation.
Figure 4: Comparison of EMD over 1000 Simulations
Figure 4 shows the E℧D result from executing 1000 simulations.
In each case each simulation's distribution was randomly sampled
using diferent sample sizes of the set (1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%) of the length of the distribution. This randomly sampled
set was then compared, using an E℧D test, to a randomly selected
distribution of the same length taken from the irst simulation. As
can be seen from Figure 4 the larger the chosen sample, the closer
the two randomly selected distributions, secondly the results are
shown to converge as more data is appended to the sample.
Secondly the distribution of the irst simulation was itted to an
exponential distribution in order to produce an expected distribu-
tion to test against (itted with χ2(12,n = 5080) = 387,p < 0.01)4.
4 χ 2 results throughout this paper are denoted using the following terminology -
χ 2([degrees of freedom], n = [number of samples)] = [result]), [statistical signiicance].
If the statistical signiicance (or p value) is less than 0.01, then the two compared
distributions can be said to from the same population, that is the are not independent.
Each of the other 999 distributions produced by each of the sim-
ulations were then compared to this itted distribution using a
χ2 distribution equivalence test, which showed each simulation
was produced from the same population (mean result - χ2(12,n =
5080) = 171,p < 0.01).
4.3 G2 - Likelihood
Once a robust and reliable data set has been generated, the next step
in the process is to analyse the results to understand the probability
of breaking the requirement. This provides a real measure that can
be used to make a decision of whether the service given to the low
DAL task is acceptable or not.
Figure 5 shows the process for understanding the probability of
the lash memory component sufering a timing requirement error.
Claim G2 is split into two parts, the irst is an assessment based on
the observed performance of the system (G16, G17), and the second
is a statistical inference to understand the exceedance probability
of the sample (G18).
4.3.1 G16, G17. The principal objective of viewing the range of
simulated results is to gain conidence that the minimum, and any
results that are close to the minimum requirement, occur with a
low probability. That is, denials of service to the low DAL tasks are
infrequent.
Figure 6 shows the range of results obtained during one simula-
tion. The main aim of reviewing the igure is to assess how far from
the minimum requirement the majority of the inter-quartile range
lies. In particular to provide conidence; the majority of results
should lie well above the requirement.
To further understand the extreme values in the simulation a
percentile test was applied to the full set of 1000 simulation results
obtained in Section 2, the results showed that 62.5ms represented
the 0.1% percentile. The analysis is expanded in Table 1 which
shows the percentage results observed close to the requirement of
50ms.
These results should be used to provide some conidence that
the vast majority of results are observed well above the minimum
requirement providing conidence that a breach of the requirement
is a one-of, rarely seen, event.
4.3.2 G18. Understanding the probability of breaking the require-
ment is assessed in one of two ways. If the requirement has been
broken during testing, then the probability of this exceedance is
estimated using an Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function
(ECDF). However, if the requirement has not been broken then the
exceedance probability is estimated using an extreme value theory
on a itted distribution.
The results of one simulation which did not break the require-
ment were analysed. The simulation was itted to an exponential
distribution in order to produce a continuous distribution for analy-
sis (χ2(12,n = 5667) = 383,p < 0.01). The probability of obtaining
a job skip interval of less than the requirement with this distribution
was found to be 4.8%.
Secondly the results from 1000 simulations were combined, as
justiied by claim G18. In this case this extended distribution did
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Figure 5: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Probability Assessment of the Requirement
Figure 6: Box Plot Diagrams Showing the Range of Job Skip Interval Times, With a Zoomed-Plot on the Right Around the
Minimum Requirement
Justifying the Service Provided to Low Criticality Tasks in a Mixed Criticality System RTNS’20, June, 2020, Paris, France
Time Between Skips % Results ℧ore Frequent Than Time Between Skips
50ms 99.9948%
60ms 99.9947%
70ms 99.76%
80ms 98.73%
90ms 96.76%
100ms 75.43%
Table 1: Percentage Results Observed Close to the Minimum Requirement After 1000 Tests
Figure 7: Goal Structured Notation Argument Exploring the Correctness of the Analysis
include instances where the requirement had been broken. Using
an ECDF function, the probability of error was found to be 0.005%.
4.4 G3 - Correctness
The results obtained so far have focused on a simulation of the
system. This is advantageous as the simulation can provide a much
larger data set to analyse than is possible from execution on a real
system test rig, secondly the results can be generated much faster
than possible on real hardware. However, it is important to review
the statistical results obtained to verify that they provide a valid
representation of the real system.
Figure 7 extends the GSN argument and examines how the analy-
sis provides representative results of the actual system performance.
Firstly the claim assumes the simulation has been executed for a
suiciently long amount of time, as veriied by claim G1 in Figure
2. Secondly the claim is veriied using real results obtained from
test rig operation (G21 and G22).
4.4.1 G21. Claim G21 concerns the input timing proiles used to
generate the simulator results. As noted in the introduction to this
section, the simulation is setup using a set of task timing proiles
generated through task-level execution in a representative envi-
ronment, as detailed further in [17]. These timing proiles provide
a representative set of results for the scheduler simulation to ran-
domly iterate over.
Secondly once a full system test rig campaign has been com-
pleted, the results from the real system should be used to both
improve the simulator, and to compliment the simulation produced
results in order to improve accuracy. This full system test campaign
is expected to provide a signiicantly large set of results to boost
conidence in the statistical analysis, arguably approaching a point
where the simulation may not be required. However, these results
would be expected to take signiicantly longer to generate, and
would be provided at a time in the software design life-cycle too
late to allow cost efective improvement.
One risk with this approach is that the test rig campaign may
indicate the simulation does not deliver representative results, this
is a signiicant risk with any approach utilising a simulator and is
in this case unavoidable. The risks are mitigated by the fact that, as
is frequently the case, the software project contains a number of
legacy components, for whom timing data should exist, but is also
mitigated by an assumption that the simulation can be reined as
soon as software testing begins, rather than waiting for its comple-
tion. The key is that the simulation provides an easy environment
for fast and eicient whole system analysis.
4.4.2 G22. The second step to understanding if the results repre-
sent the real system is to compare a set of the produced simulation
results against results obtained from the real system to ensure that
the results are both suiciently similar. To do this, a subset of test rig
results should be used to repeat the distribution analysis conducted
to conirm claim G6 in Figure 2 in order to verify that the sub-set
of test rig results produce a similar distribution to the super-set of
simulation results. Comparison to a real system test campaign is,
at this point, left to future work.
4.5 G4 - Acceptability
The analysis process has so far shown how results can be produced
that explore the behaviour of a representative system. This has
been executed until suicient coverage of the system has been
produced, resulting in an assessment of likelihood, which has inally
been veriied against real system behaviour. However the only
way to assess whether the results indicate a low DAL task will
receive enough service is down to an engineering judgement. This
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assessment must take into account the resilience, accuracy and
correctness of the wider system in the face of low DAL task errors,
as well as the individual temporal requirements of the low DAL
task
It is important to remember that the system must be resilient to
robust task errors anyway, otherwise the task could not be treated
as a robust task. However, should the results prove unacceptable, the
next step would be to assess which tasks indicate overruns, altering
their CLO igures accordingly. The use of a scheduler simulator
facilitates an easy design-analyse-rework cycle that simply could
not be achieved with a full test campaign.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an approach to verifying the service af-
forded to low DAL tasks in a ℧CS. The approach presented is
agnostic to the choice of scheduling methodology and instead fo-
cuses on a dynamic statistical process based on analysis of task
performance within a representative environment. The approach
was applied to a real aircraft engine control system. This allowed a
formerly high DAL task to be re-designated as a robust low DAL
task with its permissible utilisation being increased by a factor of
60. The analysis aimed to provide a conidence and understanding
in the service aforded to the low DAL task, which was found to
indicate a job completion rate of 99.995% based on the execution of
1000 tests. This metric, as well as the wider results, provide a system
performance understanding which should allow a system integrator
to understand compliance to the low DAL task requirements.
Even though the certiication strategy, argument and evidence,
has been considered in the context of DO-178C by the authors and
internal safety experts, as part of our future work the approach
is to be discussed with appropriate certiication authorities which
may lead to changes in the approach.
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